• 0 Posts
  • 455 Comments
Joined 2 years ago
cake
Cake day: June 16th, 2023

help-circle

  • My LDAP PTSD is coming back…

    I’ll make the following LDAP assumptions:

    • LDAP directory is configured and available
    • LDAP uri is configured and a lookup on system level is working and returns the correct POSIX uid/gid with LDAP query
    • no POSIX conflicts on the client (no object in passwd has uid/uid 11004) I can assume this because the fail over is root
    • LDAP search base is configured and returns expected POSIX values

    And I’ll make the following postgres assumptions:

    • pg_hba.conf is configured for LDAP server address, port, and search base
    • postgres can instantiate and connect to its dbs using LDAP with ldap

    Finally, I’ll assume that your nfsv4 mount is active and that POSIX operations work at Pam - level tests.


    The line

    group:      files [SUCCESS=merge] sss [SUCCESS=merge] systemd
    

    Seems weird to me; either you add success clause to both uid and gid, or none, but not one and not the other.

    This would also hint that Pam has not been updated to use LDAP.

    That’s where I’d start.

    Side note: LDAP is by default unencrypted on the wire, so to complete this exercise, you may want to setup secrecy on the server. This is especially important for db creds.








  • Sure, but if the compromise stays within its own app, like for a browser, sandboxing won’t help.

    The bulk, and I mean like 95% of the compromises I see are normal employees clicking on things that “look legit”.

    Excel is now wrapped in a browser. Discord, almost all work apps are all wrapped in a browser. So you can be completely locked down between apps like grapheneos, but if you are choosing to open links, no amount of sandboxing is going to save you.

    This is why we deploy knowbe4 and proofpoint, cause people are a liabilities, even to themselves.





  • You aren’t going to like this:

    Because if you got yourself pwned by a malicious link in discord, your account highjacked, etc., then having discord in a vm, container, chroot, jail, or whatever won’t help you on the server-side api abuse that got you pwned. In this case, you yourself should have been more vigilant.

    From your article, and with respect, I think its nice you’re thinking more about security, but you’re mixing up quite a few concepts, and you should probably make smaller moves toward security that you actually understand, instead of going all-in on qubes with only a vague concept of the difference between sandboxing and paravirtualization.


  • The idea itself is fine (not getting into how not cool it is that a vendor holds the key to your bitlocker-encrypted disk once secure boot is turned on).

    But so is WEP for WiFi, but no one uses that anymore because it’s considered compromised.

    some are

    65% of all TPM keys is “some”, I suppose. But that’s not the issue. Keys leak, it happens. The more troubling part is that Microsoft will cheerfully use the leaked key on your affected TPM and you’ll get the “safe” check mark in your next audit.

    And this was warned about in 2011 when it started rolling out.

    As for FUD, I don’t have a “fear” angle here. I can’t tell you how to live your life, use secure boot if you feel safe doing so.



  • If everyone has a copy of my passwords and authenticator keys, that wouldn’t suddenly make 2 factor auth a compromised idea.

    Not sure how this relates. If you’re saying it was a good idea at the outset, then sure… If the keys hadn’t almost all been leaked by AMI and Phoenix. MS was supposed to have created a Microsoft Certified hardware vendor program for this, which fell apart pretty quickly.

    Secure Boot is a joke, both practically (there are many, many tools in use to bypass it) and in my professional circles, it is considered obsolete like WEP. My audit controls for Secure Boot demand that an endpoint management solution like InTune is deployed.

    You don’t have to take my word for it, obviously. I’m not trying to tell you how to live your life.